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M-Pesa is a mobile phone based money transfer system in Kenya which grew at a blistering pace following
its inception in 2007.  We examine how M-Pesa is used as well as its economic impacts.  Analyzing
data from two waves of individual data on financial access in Kenya, we find that increased use of
M-Pesa lowers the propensity of people to use informal savings mechanisms such as ROSCAS, but
raises the probability of their being banked.  Using aggregate data, we calculate the velocity of M-Pesa
at between 11.0 and 14.6 person-to-person transfers per month. In addition, we find that M-Pesa causes
decreases in the prices of competing money transfer services such as Western Union. While we find
little evidence that people use their M-Pesa accounts as a place to store wealth, our results suggest














1            Introduction  
   
M-Pesa is a money transfer system operated by Safaricom, Kenya's largest cellular phone 
provider.  M-Pesa allows users to exchange cash for "e-float" on their phones, to send e-float to 
other cellular phone users, and to exchange e-float back into cash.  The story of the growth of 
mobile telephones in Africa is one of a tectonic and unexpected change in communications 
technology.  From virtually unconnected in the 1990's, over 60 percent of Africans now have 
mobile phone coverage, and there are now over ten times as many mobile phones as landline 
phones in use (Aker and Mbiti, 2010). Even with the story of mobile phones' growth as a 
background, the growth of M-Pesa is startling.  Within eight months of its inception in March 
2007, over 1.1 million Kenyans had registered to use M-Pesa, and over US$87 million had been 
transferred over the system (Safaricom, 2007). By September 2009, over 8.5 million Kenyans 
had registered to use the service and US$3.7 billion (equivalent to 10 percent of Kenya's GDP) 
had been transferred over the system since inception (Safaricom, 2009). This explosive growth 
was also mirrored in the growth of M-Pesa agents (or service locations), which grew to over 
18,000 locations by April 2010, from a base of approximately 450 in mid-2007 (Safaricom, 2009 
and Vaughan, 2007). By contrast, Kenya has only 491 bank branches, 500 postbank branches, 
and 352 ATMs (Mas and Ng'weno, 2009).   While the mobile telephone is within sight of 
becoming a mature business, e-money services like M-Pesa are still in their early days and are 
continually evolving in response to competitive pressures and customer needs. Despite all the 
attention M-Pesa has received, there is little quantitative evidence on its economic and social 
impacts.  
The combination of widespread cellular communication and the ability to transfer money 
instantly, securely, and inexpensively are together leading to enormous changes in the 
organization of economic activity, family relations, and risk management and mitigation, among 
other things.  A decade ago, family members in different parts of Kenya had a very limited scope 
of communicating with relatives in distant parts of the country, and they faced even greater 
difficulties in sending or receiving remittances.  Now, in many cases, appeals for assistance and 
the availability of resources can be communicated, and money can be transferred almost 
instantaneously.  Among the changes observers have noted are changes in the the nature, pattern 
and impact of remittances. Morawcyznski and Pickens (2009) observe that M-Pesa users sent 
smaller but more frequent remittances, which resulted in overall larger remittances to rural 
areas.   They also observe that urban migrants using M-Pesa visited their rural homes less 
frequently, potentially weakening the social ties between migrants and their home communities. 
Researchers have also noted the potential of M-Pesa to affect savings. Morawcyznski and 
Pickens (2009) observe that users often keep a balance on their M-Pesa accounts, thereby using 
the system as a rudimentary bank account despite the fact that the system does not provide 
interest. In addition, Vaughn (2007) notes that some individuals stored money in M-Pesa due to 
safety considerations, especially when travelling across the country. Using ethnographic methods 
in three communities, Plyler et al. (2010) argue that M-Pesa has enabled small businesses to 
expand and grow and has also increased the circulation of money in these communities.  The explosive growth of M-Pesa has inevitably inspired a great deal of discussion about 
what the system really is and what it could grow to be.  Is it simply a low-cost money transfer 
system competing with (or replacing) modalities such as cheques and Western Union?  Is it a 
nascent form of electronic money that will someday largely displace cash?  Can it be used as a 
savings account?  Is it a means by which financial services can be provided to the unbanked?  
Suri and Jack (2011) report that three out of four M-Pesa users indicate that they use it to save 
money. Recently, the potential for M-Pesa to be a savings vehicle has received even more 
attention, as Safaricom and Equity Bank have introduced M-Kesho, an interest-bearing savings 
account that is directly linked to M-Pesa.     
In this paper we examine how M-Pesa is being used in Kenya.  We combine data from a 
number of sources including micro-level survey data (the FinAccess surveys), transaction data 
from M-Pesa agents, price data from money transfer companies, and aggregate data from 
Safaricom and the Central Bank of Kenya.   We pay particular attention to the question of 
whether M-Pesa is solely a low-value money transfer system or a nascent form of a means of 
saving, providing broader financial access for people who are unbanked.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the 
structure of M-Pesa.  In Section 3, we examine M-Pesa’s role as a money transfer service.  We 
also examine the characteristics of users, explore data on the distribution of withdrawal and 
deposit sizes, and analyze the effect of M-Pesa on alternative money transfer modalities.   In 
Section 4, we examine microeconomic evidence of how M-Pesa affects outcomes such as the 
propensity of individuals to use financial institutions as well as to accumulate savings.   In 
Section 5, we explore the monetary aspects of M-Pesa, including the velocity of e-money 
circulation.  Section 6 addresses the question of why people do not store much value in their M-
Pesa accounts.  Section 7 concludes.   
   
2              M-Pesa Structure  
          
Basic Structure  
 There are three basic transactions that customers conduct with M-Pesa.   
•  A customer may deposit money at an M-Pesa outlet in return for e-float (called a "cash-
in" transaction.)  The customer is required to show a valid identification document, and 
his identity and the amount of the deposit are logged in a book kept at the outlet.   Upon 
receipt of the money, the M-Pesa agent enters the customer's telephone number and 
deposit information into his/her cell phone, and the customer waits at the outlet window 
until he/she receives a confirmation text message that e-float has been deposited.   Unless 
the system is running slowly (which happens occasionally), the whole transaction takes 
about a minute or less.      
•  A customer may exchange e-float for cash at an M-Pesa outlet (called a "cash out" 
transaction.) Again, the customer must show a valid identification document, and the 
transaction is logged. The customer tells the the shop clerk how much cash he/she wants, 
then chooses "withdraw cash" on the M-Pesa menu on his phone, enters the amount to be 
withdrawn (plus the relevant fee), and enters the agent number.  The agent then receives a 
text indicating that the transaction is complete, and the agent then gives the appropriate 
amount of cash to the customer.  This whole transaction takes about one minute.  
•  Finally, a user may transfer e-float from his/her phone to another phone.  Our study refers 
to such a transfer as a “person-to-person transfer,” even though one or both of the parties 
may be an institution or firm.  The user enters the phone number of the recipient and the 
amount to be transferred on his/her cellphone.  The sender and recipient each receive a 
text message stating that money has been transferred.  
These three basic transactions can be combined in a number of ways.  For example, a user may 
deposit cash and send the full amount deposited to another user, who can then withdraw the full 
amount transferred.  We refer to this use as "deposit-transfer-withdraw."  Alternatively, a user 
who receives a transfer from one person may transfer the e-float to some other user instead of 
withdrawing cash.  E-float could circulate in this manner indefinitely, like conventional cash.  A 
third usage possibility is where a user deposits cash and then later withdraws it him/herself 
without having transferred it.  Anecdotally, it is said that people do this for safety when they are 
traveling (Vaughan, 2007; Morawczynski, 2009).  
The usage patterns described above can be mixed in varying ways.   For example, a user 
may receive a transfer and withdraw some of the value while transferring some of the remaining 
amount elsewhere and leaving some e-float in his account for future transactions.  Of particular 
interest to us is a pattern in which a user might receive a transfer and not withdraw it right away 
for several reasons: to economize on transaction fees, to economize on the effort of going to an 
M-Pesa outlet, or to benefit from the safety of storing value on a phone rather than in cash. M-
Pesa is safer than cash because a PIN is required to perform any transaction. If a phone is stolen 
or lost, the M-Pesa funds are safe unless the PIN has been compromised. If the PIN is 
compromised and funds are transfered to another account, the legitimate account holder can 
recover his/her funds if they have not been withdrawn by the fraudulent recipient by initiating a 
transfer reversal through the customer service department.  
    One of our goals is to better understand such patterns of use.  One question in particular 
is how much of the use of M-Pesa is of the deposit-transfer-withdraw type.  To the extent that it 
is used just this way, M-Pesa is primarily a simple money transfer service (which is hardly to say 
that it isn't economically important). By contrast, other uses of M-Pesa suggest other functions.  
To the extent that e-money circulates among several users between an initial cash-in transaction 
and a final cash-out transaction, it can be seen as an evolving alternative to currency.  Similarly, 
to the extent that people hold e-float balances on their phones for significant periods of time,  M-Pesa can be seen as having aspects of banking (as will be seen below, one can even view it as 
paying interest.)
1  
All M-Pesa e-float is backed 100% by deposits held at three commercial banks in Kenya.  
Interest earned on these deposits is donated to a charity, which allows Safaricom to avoid being 
regulated as a bank.  An extensive description of the arrangements between Safaricom and the 
network of agents who service M-Pesa users can be found in Eijkman, Kendall, and Mas (2010) 
and Suri and Jack (2011).  
 
Pricing  
 Table 1 shows the basic pricing scheme for M-Pesa. To deposit money, a user must register with 
M-Pesa at an agent location. This is a relatively short process and only requires a valid 
identification document such as a national ID or passport.  Recipients of M-Pesa need not be 
registered.  There is a higher fee for sending money to non-registered users, but they are not 
charged any fees to withdraw money and are unable to send the money onwards since they are 
unregistered.  The overall transaction fee is far lower for sending to a registered user than to a 
non-registered user.  In practice 70 percent of users are registered, and approximately 90 percent 
of  transactions are conducted by registered users.
2  
   The pricing structure of M-Pesa is simple and intuitive.  However, the pricing structure 
has a number of "notches" in the terminology of Slemrod (2010).  These are points at which 
incremental changes in customer behavior cause discrete jumps in costs.   The incentives around 
notches are far stronger than those observed at "kinks" in price schedules, such as points where 
the marginal tax rate changes.   For example, in the M-Pesa tariff schedule, the fee for 
withdrawing up to 1-2,500 Ksh is 25 Ksh., while the fee for withdrawing 2,501-5,000 Ksh. is 45 
Ksh.  Thus, a person who withdraws 2,600 Ksh. will be paying a marginal fee of 20 Ksh. (20%) 
on the last 100 Ksh. withdrawn compared to a fee of 1% on the first 2,500 Ksh. withdrawn.   The 
response of users to the price notches in the M-Pesa tariff schedule should be informative about 
                                                 
1 As mentioned above, Safaricom and Equity Bank are now introducing a new service called M-Kesho which allows 
for mobile phone access to a low-cost bank account.   There is no charge for opening the account, no periodic fees, 
and no minimum or maximum balance (M-Pesa has a maximum balance of 50,000 Ksh.) Balances from 1-2,000 
Ksh (approximately 0.13-25 USD) receive 0.5% interest per year; from 2,001-5,000 KSH, 1% per year; from 5,001-
10,000 KSH, 2% per year; and above 10,000 KSH ($125), 3% per year.   Funds can be transferred without a free 
from M-Pesa to M-Kesho, although transfer back to M-Pesa costs 30 Ksh.  M-Kesho also offers microcredit and 
insurance services.  Microloans can be requested for 100-5000 Ksh, with a 10% application fee.  Loans are approved 
or rejected based on a credit score determined by looking at M-Pesa, M-Kesho, and Equity Bank account activity in 
the last 6 months, and must be paid back within 30 days (a penalty of 3% of one's outstanding balance is charged for 
every day after this 30-day period).  Insurance can be obtained for 530 Ksh for a year if paid all at once, 830 Ksh for 
the year if paid on a monthly basis, or 1030 Ksh for a year if paid on a weekly basis.  For the first year, this 
insurance is limited to personal accident related expenses (though this is fairly broadly defined), but after a year it is 
upgraded to full life insurance (150,000 ksh. death or permanent disability benefit plus 20,000 ksh. funeral 
expenses.) 
 
2 Refer to the data appendix for details on the computation of this variable the optimization problems faced by users.  Below, we explore this issue by looking at data on the 
distribution of withdrawal sizes.    
   
3              Uses and Economic Impacts of M-Pesa  
    
3.1              M-Pesa as a Money Transfer System  
   
3.1.1    Survey Results  
How money was sent in 2006 and 2009  
 
Prior to the introduction of M-pesa, individuals used a mixture of informal and formal channels 
to transfer money. Larger bus companies such as Akamba Bus company or Scandinavia Bus 
Company offered formal money or parcel transfer services, where recipients would collect the 
funds at a designated bus terminal. However, smaller bus companies or independent mini-bus 
operators (matatus) would perform these transactions informally, and in some cases the bus 
driver would carry the funds with the promise to deliver them. In other cases, individuals would 
disguise money transfers as packages and place them on the bus for delivery to the designated 
terminal ( Kabbucho et al., 2003 and Morawczynski, 2009). The post office offered a variety of 
different money transfer products including instant money transfer (postapay) and money orders 
which would be delivered to the post office closest to the recipient (Kabbucho et al., 2003). 
Banks and   money transfer companies such as Western Union or Moneygram also offered 
transfer services, although their outlet or branch networks were not as extensive as the post 
office's. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the change in sending and receiving methods between 2006 and 
2009.  The figures show that the most common methods to send or receive money were through 
friends, bus companies, or the post office in 2006.  Over 50 percent of people sent money using 
friends while close to 50 percent received money via this medium. Approximately 20 percent 
sent money using the post office, while close to 30 percent received funds this way. Other formal 
methods such as sending money through banks or money transfer companies like Western Union 
were less common with less than 10 percent using these methods to send or receive funds. 
The inception of M-Pesa in 2007 dramatically changed the money transfer market. In less 
than two years since its inception, M-Pesa was the leading money transfer method with over 50 
percent sending money via M-Pesa and over 65 percent receiving funds through the system in 
2009 (Figures 1 and 2). The emergence of M-Pesa as the dominant money transfer mechanism 
virtually eliminated the use of post office products, bus companies, and formal channels such as 
Western Union and banks, where between 3.5 percent and 0.4 percent of individuals now use these methods to send or receive money (Figures 1 and 2). However, sending and receiving 
funds through friends remains a popular means of money transfer, where 33 percent of 
individuals send money via a friend and 22 percent receive funds through a friend in 2009 
(Figures 1 and 2). 
 
 
Uses of M-Pesa  
Figure 3 summarizes the data on M-Pesa use from the 2009 Finacess Survey in descending order 
of frequency. Close to 42 percent of M-Pesa users reported using the system to purchase mobile 
phone airtime. Approximately 26 percent of users reported using M-Pesa to save money. While 
this is a relatively high proportion, it is much lower than the 75 percent saving rate reported in 
Jack and Suri (2011). Close to 20 percent of users also report using M-Pesa while travelling, 
presumably for safety concerns as discussed in Vaughan (2007) and Morawczynski (2009). 
Approximately six percent of users made donations via M-Pesa, and our experience in the field 
suggests this has grown as currently the majority of calls for donations now include an M-Pesa 
option. Only six percent claim to receive payments on M-Pesa, while only two percent claim to 
receive salaries or wages by M-Pesa. Despite these low levels, 50 percent of M-Pesa users report 
that they would like to receive their main income by M-Pesa, mainly due to speed and 
accessibility.  The main reported reasons for not wanting to use M-Pesa for the receipt of income 
was a strong cash preference (30 percent) and a fear of losing their phone (25 percent). 
Surprisingly, 17 percent of those who did not want to receive their income on M-pesa were 
worried they could access the money too easily and thus spend it right away, while another 14 
percent claimed their salary would not fit in M-Pesa. Almost 4 percent used an ATM to 
withdraw cash from their M-Pesa account and 3 percent used M-pesa to buy goods or pay bills. 
While the bill-paying prevalence was low in 2009, we expect this to grow as Safaricom has 
initiated a number of strategic partnerships where customers may now pay for goods and services 
using M-Pesa. For example, several hospitals, insurance companies, schools, and grocery stores 
now accept M-Pesa payments. As argued in Aker and Mbiti (2010), these partnerships are part of 
M-Pesa’s evolution from a pure money transfer system into a payment platform and a formal 
(regulated) financial service.  
 
 3.1.2    Distribution of Withdrawals and Deposits   
Our data comes from three M-Pesa outlets.  As described in Eijkman, Kendall and Mas (2010), 
Cyber Center is an urban outlet in the city of Kisumu, which has a population of 350,000.   The 
outlet is located near one of the city's markets.  Katito is small town with a population of roughly 
five thousand, located in a rural area about a one-hour trip from Kisumu.   It also services 
surrounding rural areas.  Homa Bay is classified as a "district" outlet, meaning that it is in a 
provincial market town with a population of roughly 20,000 on a main highway.   
   Table 2 shows data on the distribution of withdrawal and deposit amounts at the three 
outlets.   Figure 4 show the histograms of the distribution of withdrawals from each outlet. The 
most striking finding in this data is the extent to which a large part of the distribution is 
composed of very small withdrawals.  This is most visible in Katito, the rural outlet, where the 
median withdrawal is only 900 Ksh. (about US $13).  The 10th percentile of the distibution of 
withdrawals in Katito is 250 Ksh., which implies that one-tenth of users pay a commission of 
10% or more.
3   
We can also use Figure 4 to address the issue of whether there is a large response to the 
price notches in the M-Pesa tariff discussed above.  Although we do not perform a formal test, in 
most applicable cases we see remarkably little evidence of any response to these notches at all.  
In the case of Katito, for example, the only price notch that is in the range of an appreciable part 
of the data is at 2,500 Ksh.  Although there is indeed a point of mass at this level, it is not out of 
line with what one would expect given the similar masses at round numbers (500, 1,000, 1,500, 
etc.).  Indeed, there were many fewer withdrawals at 2,500 Ksh. than at 3,000 Ksh. We see this 
for the other outlets as well.  It is true that in Homa Bay, which has the largest withdrawals, there 
are large spikes in the distribution at 10,000 and 20,000 ksh., both of which are price notches.  
Similarly, there is a spike at 10,000 at Cyber Center.   This is consistent with users reacting to the 
incentives of the price notches, but it is also possible that these large spikes are just due to these 
figures being round numbers.    
As another test of whether users of M-Pesa change their behavior in response to 
characteristics of the pricing structure, we examined data on deposit sizes.  Specifically, we are 
interested in the extent to which people transferring money take into account the fees paid by 
those who withdraw money (and also the transfer fees that they pay themselves).   If such a 
deposits are made as part of a deposit-transfer-withdraw transaction, then the total fees of the 
transaction will be 55 Ksh (that is, 30 Ksh. for the transfer plus 25 Ksh for the withdrawal).  A 
depositor who wanted the recipient to end up with, say, 1,000 Ksh. would have to deposit 1,055 
Ksh.  We think of small deposits in amounts ending with 55 Ksh as being "fee aware."  To the 
extent that we see deposits of such amounts, it suggests to us that there is a confluence of three 
factors: first, the depositor intends to transfer the full amount of his/her deposit (minus the 
transfer fee); second that he/she expects the recipient to withdraw the amount of the transfer 
received; and third that the sender wants the recipient to have access to a round-number amount 
of money.    
Table 3 shows data on the deposits pooled from the three outlets described above.  We 
consider only deposit amounts below 2,600 Ksh, because the withdrawal fee rises after 2,500 
Ksh.
4  Our sample is 6,036 deposits.  We tabulate deposits based on the last two digits of the 
deposit size.  The table shows that, not surprisingly, the biggest masses of the distribution are at 
00, 50, and 25, which are simply round numbers.   However, the fourth largest mass in the 
distribution (6.8%) is indeed at 55, which clearly corresponds to awareness of fees.  Further, the 
                                                 
3 Although we do not have data that links withdrawals to transfers, it is likely that in most cases, someone who 
withdraws 250 ksh. has just received this as a transfer, which cost the sender 30 ksh.  Thus the overall cost of 
receiving 225 ksh. after fees was 280 ksh., a loss of 19.6%.  
4 The withdrawal fee itself is not counted toward the price of a withdrawal.  Thus a customer with a balance of Ksh. 
2525 in her account could receive Ksh. 2500 in cash fifth largest mass in the distribution is at 30 (4.0%), suggesting that some depositors are taking 
into account transfer fees but not withdrawal fees.  Nonetheless, our interpretation of this data is 
that fee-aware deposits are relatively rare. Of course it is not clear which of the three factors 
described above is failing in most cases.   
    
3.1.3       The Impact of M-pesa on Money Transfer Companies  
A number of papers have documented the impacts of mobile phones causing reduced price 
variation in markets. Jensen (2007) and Aker (2010) find that the introduction of mobile phones 
reduced price dispersion in fish markets in India and grain markets in Niger respectively. In these 
instances the mobile phone technology has increased information flows, which has resulted in 
price reductions. In contrast, the development and introduction of M-pesa can be viewed as a 
"disruptive technology" (Bower and Christensen, 1995)  or an example of "creative destruction" 
(Schumpeter, 1942 and Aghion and Howitt, 1992), where M-Pesa revolutionized the money 
transfer industry. As Figures 1 and 2 show, M-Pesa became the dominant money transfer 
mechanism within 2 years of its inception. Ethnographic work by Morawczynski (2009) suggests 
that M-Pesa's popularity has been driven by its speed, safety, reliability, extensive network of 
outlets, and its price relative to the alternatives. Prior to the introduction of M-Pesa, Kabbucho et 
al (2003) document that the cost of instantly sending US$100 through formal channels ranged 
between US$12 (MoneyGram) and US$20 (bank wire transfer), while the cost slower formal 
channels ranged from $3 (bus companies) to $6 (postal money order). Compared to these 
alternatives M-Pesa offered a significantly cheaper method of instantly transferring funds, where 
the cost of sending US$100 to a non-registered user by M-pesa was approximately US$2.50 in 
early 2008, while the cost of sending to a registered user was even less (Safaricom, 2008).  
The dominance of M-pesa can also be observed in the the financial statements of the 
competitors. Gikunju (2009) examines the financial statements of the Postal Corporation of 
Kenya and finds that revenues and profits for its PostaPay money transfer service declined 
rapidly after the introduction of M-Pesa and suggests that Western Union’s and MoneyGram’s 
profits have also declined over the same period. Faced with obsolescence, money transfer 
companies such as Western Union and MoneyGram have responded by cutting prices, even 
though they are still unable to match M-pesa's superior convenience (Gikunju, 2009). Figure 5 
shows the changes in the money transfer price schedule for Western Union and MoneyGram 
from the pre-M-Pesa period to the post- M-Pesa period. Overall, these figures show a dramatic 
reduction in the transaction prices of money transfers. On average, the commission (defined as 
price to send money divided by the amount sent) charged for money transfers fell from 
approximately 7% in 2003 to 3% in 2010. However, we cannot entirely attribute this decline to 
the competitive pressures induced by the M-Pesa revolution as other factors such as general 
technological changecould reduce transaction costs and thus reduce prices. Therefore, simple 
before-and-after comparisons of the price changes will not be sufficient to identify the 
competitive impact of M-Pesa on the prices of competitors.  
We employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy in order to identify the impact of 
M-Pesa on competitors prices. We construct a database of prices for the main formal competitors in Kenya: MoneyGram and Western Union.
5 We obtained the pre-M-Pesa price schedules from 
Kabbucho et al (2003) and the current price schedules from each provider’s website. As each 
firm uses different price brackets, we created consistent and comparable price schedules by 
examining the commissions (price/send amount) for send amounts in 100 Kshs intervals ranging 
from each company’s minimum send amount to each company’s maximum send amount.
5  Our 
empirical strategy exploits the differences in maximum transaction limits between M-Pesa and 
its competitors. Central Bank Regulations place a maximum transaction limit of 35,000 Kshs on 
M-Pesa, while the transaction limits of MoneyGram and Western Union transactions exceed 
500,000 Kshs. Given these transaction limits, we would expect to see greater competitive 
pressures due to M-Pesa on transactions below the M-Pesa threshold of 35,000 Kshs compared 
to transactions above that threshold. Figure 5 provides some suggestive evidence of this effect. 
Focusing on Moneygram, we see that the prices for smaller transactions decreased dramatically, 
while those for large transactions remained more static. A simple comparison of means above 
and below the 35,000 Kshs threshold and across time is shown in Table 4. This table shows that 
there were larger reductions in the prices of transfers below 35,000 Kshs compared to those 
above. We can formally examine this assertion using the following empirical specification: 
 
jkt k j t j t j jkt post under post under p ε γ λ δ δ δ δ + + + × + + + = 35 35 3 2 1 0    (1)   
 
where is the commission defined as price of sending j shillings, under35 is a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the transaction amount j is less than 35,000 shillings, post is an indicator 
variable for the post M-pesa period (i.e. 2010), λ  is a transaction amount fixed effect and γ  is a 
company fixed effect. The coefficient of interest is  3 δ , which captures the impact of M-Pesa on 
prices. The estimates from Equation 1 are shown in Table 5. These results show that the prices of 
transactions below 35,000 shillings fell by six percentage points, which is approximately a 43 
percent reduction in the prices of transactions under 35,000 shillings from 2003. Overall, prices 
in this segment fell from approximately 14 percent to four percent; thus, our estimates imply that 
competitive pressure from M-Pesa accounts for approximately 60 percent of the decline in prices 
from 2003 to 2010.   
A potential concern with our estimation strategy is that we could be simply capturing 
falling trends in prices. Since we only have two periods of data, we cannot include company 
specific trends in our analysis. However, we can perform some falsification tests to ensure that 
our results are not spurious. We create a series of false (and arbitrary) thresholds of 100,000, 
125,000 and 150,000 Kshs. and estimate Equation 1 using these fake thresholds and restrict the 
sample to transactions over 35,000 shillings to avoid M-Pesa effects. Table 6 shows the results of 
this falsification exercise. We do not find negative effects of these false thresholds, but we do 
find small but positive and significant impacts of this threshold suggesting that trends are not 
driving our results discussed above.  
                                                 
5 The Postal Corporation of Kenya also has an instant money transfer product called Posta Pay. However, we were 
unable to collect pre-M-Pesa prices. We did have early 2008 prices and we do observe the same patterns as we show 
in our regressions While M-Pesa has forced money transfer companies to lower prices, M-Pesa has also 
induced these firms and other financial firms to improve their products and services. In some 
cases, firms have partnered with M-Pesa to offer an integrated service. For example, Western 
Union recently partnered with M-Pesa to offer international money transfers in which migrants 
in the diaspora can now send remittances to their friends and family via M-Pesa with Western 
Union serving as an intermediary. Pesa-Point, an independent network of ATMs, allows M-Pesa 
users to withdraw cash using its large network of ATMs.  Commercial banks in Kenya were 
initially opposed to M-Pesa and lobbied the government to regulate M-Pesa and other mobile 
money platforms under the commercial banking regulations (Njiraini and Anyanzwa, 2008). 
After these efforts failed, banks partnered with M-Pesa to offer better services to customers and 
in some cases became M-Pesa agents. There is also suggestive evidence that M-Pesa has 
increased the efficiency of the banking system.  According to a 2009 newspaper article, the 
advent of M-Pesa has caused commercial banks to work toward speeding up the check clearing 
process, which took a minimum of three days.
6    
   
3.2    Characteristics of Users  
   
We use data from the 2009 FinAccess survey to examine basic patterns and characteristics of M-
Pesa users and their usage patterns. Overall, our data show that approximately 40 percent of 
Kenyans have used M-Pesa, with close to 30 percent formally registered with Safaricom. As 
discussed in Aker and Mbiti (2010), M-Pesa users are more likely to be younger, wealthier, 
better educated,  banked, employed in non-farm sectors, to own cell phones, and to reside in 
urban areas (Table 7).  
We examine cross-tabulations of M-Pesa use by individual characteristics in Table 8. 
Males, urban residents, banked individuals, the wealthy, the better-educated, and those employed 
in the non-farm sector were more likely to use M-Pesa. Higher socio-economic status individuals 
are more likely to use M-Pesa to purchase airtime, save and store money while travelling, and 
use M-Pesa to pay wages than their respective counterparts. Focusing on saving patterns, Table 8 
shows that 35 percent of banked individuals use M-Pesa to save while only 19 percent of 
unbanked individuals used M-Pesa to save. Similarly, 30 percent of wealthy individuals report 
using M-Pesa to save, while only 15 percent of poor individuals report doing so. Similar gaps are 
also observed between the more-educated and less-educated individuals. When we examine the 
characteristics of users who use M-Pesa as a safe-keeping mechanism while travelling, we find 
very similar patterns to those found in savings. We find that the wealthier, more-educated, and 
banked individuals are each approximately 2.5 times more likely to report using M-Pesa while 
travelling when compared to their counterparts.  
                                                 
6 "Why central bank position on mobile banking attracts wrath," 2/6/2009, The Standard 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=1144015709&cid=457& 
 We observe large differences in the frequency of M-Pesa use across demographic and 
economic groups in Table 9. Individuals with bank accounts use M-Pesa almost three times as 
much as those without bank accounts. Urban residents, richer individuals, the more-educated, 
and those in the non-farm sector use M-Pesa almost twice as often as rural residents, poorer 
individuals, the less-educated and those employed in the farm sector respectively. While those 
with mobile phone used M-Pesa three times as often as those without phones, there are much 
smaller differences between men and women (with men using M-Pesa 35 percent more 
frequently than women). As Columns (2) to (5) suggest, these disparities are mainly driven by 
differences in daily and weekly use, in which the banked are almost three times as likely to use 
M-Pesa daily or weekly as the unbanked, and urban residents are almost twice as likely to use M-
Pesa daily or weekly compared to rural residents. While daily and weekly users are generally 
more affluent, educated, and urban, they only account for 1.6 and 14.4 percent of all users 
respectively, while 32.7 percent of users are monthly users, and 51.3 percent are irregular users. 
However, using our annualized measure of M-Pesa usage, we find that daily users (1.6 percent of 
users) account for 32 percent of transactions, weekly users account for 41 percent of transactions, 
monthly users account for approximately 21 percent of transactions, and irregular users account 
for only  6% of transactions.  
Overall, these simple cross-tabulations of  the intensity of M-Pesa use and the main uses 
of M-Pesa by individual characteristics reveal that the most intense users generally have higher 
socio-economic status. Moreover, theses higher SES individuals are also more likely to use M-
Pesa in ways that could reap large economic gains such as savings. Taken together, these 
patterns perhaps suggest that more affluent members of society are among the biggest 
beneficiaries of M-Pesa. This, of course, does not preclude poorer and more vulnerable members 
of society from reaping significant economic and social benefits from M-Pesa. More research 
will be needed to examine the extent to which M-Pesa benefits are distributed across socio-
economic strata.  
   
4.    Economic Impacts of M-Pesa: Micro-level evidence  
 Morawcyznski and Pickens (2009) find that M-Pesa has changed the patterns of remittances. 
This observation is supported by the 2009 FinAccess surveys which show that almost 35 percent 
report that they have increased the frequency of sending transfers due to M-Pesa, while 31 
percent report an increase in the receipt frequency of transfers due to M-Pesa. (Figure 6). 
Surprisingly, 18 percent report a decrease in the sending frequency, while 22 percent report a 
decrease in the receiving frequency, with the remainder reporting no change in transfer 
frequency. Figure 7 shows the change in the amount of transfers received. Almost 35 percent of 
users claim that they sent larger transfers due to M-Pesa, while 30 percent claim to have received 
larger transfers because of M-Pesa. In contrast roughly 20 percent report decreases in the amount 
of transfers sent or received, with the remainder reporting no change in the amount of transfers 
received or reported. We find very strong correlations between reported changes in transfer 
frequency and reported changes in the amount transferred. Over 85 percent of individuals report 
the same effect for both changes in frequency and changes in transfer amount (for both sending 
and receiving). For example, 87 percent of individuals who claim to have received transfers more frequently report that the amount of transfer has also increased, and a very small percentage 
report sending smaller transfers more frequently. This suggests that people do not in fact send 
smaller transfers more frequently as reported in Morawcyznski and Pickens (2009). However, as 
we have no data on the extent or magnitude of these changes, we are unable to examine the 
magnitude of changes in the frequency or size of transfers due to M-Pesa.  
The qualititative studies on M-Pesa such as Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) have 
suggested that M-Pesa serves as a partial substitute for the formal banking system. Prior to the 
introduction of M-Pesa, most Africans were excluded from modern financial services. Using data 
ranging between 2001 and 2005, Beck et al. (2007) show that African countries lagged in 
financial access. During this period they show that Ghana had 1.6 branches per 100,000 and 
Kenya had 1.3 branches per 100,000, while Uganda and Tanzania both had less than 0.6 
branches per 100,000. The ATM penetration of these countries was even lower -- ranging from 1 
per 100,000 in Kenya to less than 0.20 per 100,000 in Tanzania. In contrast, the U.S. had 31 
bank branches and 120 ATMs per 100,000 people during that period. Perhaps partly as a result of 
the small banking networks in many African countries, a low proportion of individuals have a 
bank account.  On average the FinScope surveys show that 30% of East and Southern African 
adults have a formal bank account (FinMark Trust, 2008). These proportions range from a high 
of 63% in South Africa to low of 9% in Tanzania.   With the low levels of financial development 
in many African countries, many observers have identified the potential for systems such as M-
Pesa to expand the reach of the financial system and provide a platform to deliver financial 
services to the poor and excluded.  Burgess and Pande (2005) show that the expansion of rural 
banking in India significantly reduced rural poverty rates. While this was mainly driven by 
increased access to credit, mobile systems such as M-Pesa could facilitate the expansion of 
branchless banking, in which banks increase the financial reach using agents as intermediaries to 
provide services to clients in rural and remote areas where the fixed costs of opening a branch 
would be prohibitive (Pickens et al., 2009). This possibility, however, is contingent upon banks' 
willingness to serve poorer clients and upon government regulations that promote or hinder 
branchless banking.    
A number of qualitative studies such as Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) and Mas and 
Morawczynski (2009) have explored the economic and social impacts of M-Pesa in Kenya. For 
instance, Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) find ethnographic evidence that M-Pesa has 
changed the savings behavior, the pattern of remittances, and has increased rural livelihoods.  
While these studies provide suggestive evidence of the impacts of M-Pesa, they are generally 
unable to quantify the effects of the system and are limited by their small sample sizes. An 
exception is Jack and Suri's (2010) empirical study that shows that M-Pesa improves the ability 
of households to smooth risks. We contribute to the literature by providing quantitative estimates 
of the impact of M-Pesa in Kenya on a variety of economic and social outcomes including 
financial access and usage. We combine  the 2006 and 2009 Finaccess surveys and create a 
balanced panel of the 190 sub-locations that were surveyed in both rounds in order to examine 
the economic impact of M-Pesa on various outcomes pertaining to remittances, financial access, 
and economic livelihood.
7 Sublocations are the smallest administrative unit in Kenya and consist 
of 2 to 3 villages in rural areas or a large neighborhood in a city. The summary statistics of this 
estimation sample is shown in Table 10.   
                                                 
7 See data appendix for more details on the construction of the estimation sample. We examine the relationship between M-Pesa and various economic and social outcomes 
at the sublocation level using the following specification: 
jt j t jt jt jt T X mpesa y υ μ β β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 '     (2)   
  where  jt mpesa is the proportion of individuals that use M-Pesa in sublocation j at period t, X is 
a vector of controls including education, gender, age, marriage rate, and wealth, T is a time fixed 
effect,  μ  is the sub-location fixed effect that captures time invariant unobservable variables at 
the sub-location level, and υ  is an idiosyncratic error term. y is a set of outcomes variables that 
includes frequency of sending and receiving transfers, possession of a bank account, saving 
methods and employment. 
Simple regression estimation of equation (2) will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates if the 
time-invariant unobservables (μ ) or the time-varying unobservables (υ ) are correlated with M-
Pesa use and our set of outcome variables. To circumvent this we employ a sub-location fixed 
effects instrumental variable (FE-IV) procedure to eliminate the time-invariant heterogeneity and 
biases due to endogenous M-Pesa adoption. Specifying Δ as the sub-location first-difference 
operator, we can estimate the following fixed effect regression:  
jt jt jt jt X mpesa y υ β β β Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ 2 1 0 '       (3) 
While biases due to time-invariant unobservables are eliminated in equation (3), the 
estimates will still be biased and inconsistent if Δε is correlated with Δmpesa. We need an 
instrument (or a set of instruments) that predicts M-Pesa use but does not directly impact our set 
of outcomes. Both rounds of the data contain perceptions of the most common money transfer 
methods; however, we focus solely upon the 2006 perception data as the 2009 perceptions would 
be influenced by M-Pesa. Respondents are asked to identify the riskiest, slowest and costly 
money transfer method. We focus on the proportion of residents that identify sending money 
with a friend as the riskiest method, the proportion of residents that identify the post office as the 
slowest and the proportion that identify money transfer companies as the most expensive.  If 
more respondents in a sub-location feel that their alternative means of transferring money are 
inefficient, they would be more likely to adopt M-Pesa. Moreover, conditional on the sub-
location fixed effect, this 2006 perception should have no direct impact on outcomes (or the 
change in outcomes). The identification assumption is conditional on the vector of controls (such 
as wealth and education) and the sub-location fixed effect, the perceptions of the alternative 
methods will only indirectly affect the set of outcomes (such as banking) through M-Pesa 
adoption.   
We can specify the set of estimating equations for the FE-IV regression as:  
jt jt jt jt X mpesa y υ β β β Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ 2 1 0 '       (4)     
ν α α α Δ + Δ + + = Δ 2 1 0 0 ' ' jt j jt X Z mpesa      (5)                                
where Z is the set of instruments: the proportion that rank friends as the riskiest method to 
transfer money in 2006, the proportion that rank the post office as the slowest method in 2006 
and the proportion that rank money transfer companies as the most expensive option in 2006.  
The extent to which transferring funds through friends is risky will be mostly determined 
by social capital and crime. In terms of financial access, the most plausible concern is that banks 
are less likely to locate in these areas due to security concerns. Since these areas are more likely 
to adopt M-Pesa then this would lead to an underestimate of the impact of M-Pesa adoption on 
financial access. The are a number of factors that could determine efficiency of money transfers 
via the post-office. First, these could reflect the motivation of post office employees. Employee 
motivation could be driven by the quality of supervision. If better supervisors were located in 
faster growing areas (which were more likely to see expansions of financial services), then this 
would also lead to underestimates of the impact of M-Pesa adoption. Alternatively, the speed of 
the post office could reflect the quality of transportation links or local infrastructure (e.g. 
electricity, telephone links). If financial institutions were less likely to expand to these more 
“isolated” areas, then this would again lead to an underestimate of the impact of M-Pesa 
adoption. However, if these institutions were more likely to expand in these areas then our 
methodology would overestimate the impact of M-Pesa adoption. However, we feel that the 
costs of operating in “isolated” areas may be prohibitive for banks and thus we feel that they are 
unlikely to expand in these areas. Finally, the speed of the post office could reflect Since the 
price schedule for money transfer companies does not vary within Kenya, the perceptions of cost 
are likely driven by marketing and word of mouth. If these companies target their marketing in 
faster growing areas (which were more likely to see expansions of financial services), then this 
would also lead to underestimates of the impact of M-Pesa adoption. 
The results from equations (2) to (3) are shown in Table 11. The estimates from the 
random effects specifications show a positive relationship between M-Pesa adoption and 
frequency of sending and receiving transfers, although only the estimate of sending transfers is 
statistically significant. The estimates also show a strong positive association between M-Pesa 
adoption and bank use, formal savings, and employment. In addition, the estimates show a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between M-Pesa adoption and saving money 
using secret hiding places. Similar patterns are observed in fixed effect specifications. The point 
estimates on sending remittances, bank use, formal savings, and employment are very similar 
when compared to the random effects specifications. However, we do observe the larger negative 
correlations between M-Pesa and informal savings and using a secret hiding place to save 
money. 
We estimate equations (4) and (5) in order to obtain causal estimates of the impacts of M-
Pesa. Table 12 shows first stage relationship between our set of instruments and the endogenous 
variables. The estimates show that M-Pesa adoption was positively correlated with greater 
proportions of individuals who rank using friends as the riskiest money transfer method. 
Similarly, perceived slowness of transferring funds using the post office in period 0 and the 
perceived cost of money transfer companies have positive and significant effects on M-Pesa adoption. This set of instruments is highly significant, with a joint F test of 26, which is well 
above the weak instrument thresholds. 
The FE-IV estimates of equation (4) and (5) are shown in Table 13. These estimates show 
that M-Pesa adoption led to increases in the frequency of sending transfers. The point estimate 
shows that if M-Pesa were universally adopted, individuals would send 5 more remittances per 
annum. Evaluating this point estimate using the mean M-Pesa adoption rate of 40 percent, we see 
that M-Pesa increased the frequency of sending remittances by 2, which is more than double the 
2006 level. Our estimates imply that M-Pesa accounts for almost the entire increase in the 
sending frequency of transfers between 2006 and 2009 (Table 10). This is consistent with Figure 
6, which shows that 35% report increases in the frequency of sending transfers due to M-Pesa. 
While we observe significant increases in the sending frequency of transfers, we surprisingly do 
not find any effect of M-Pesa on the frequency of receiving transfers, even though 30% report 
increases in frequency of receiving transfers due to M-Pesa. 
While M-Pesa has been touted for banking the "unbanked", there are no estimates on the 
direct impact of M-Pesa on people adopting bank accounts. Row (5) of Table 13 provides this 
evidence. These estimates show that increased M-Pesa adoption leads to greater bank use. The 
point estimates imply that universal adoption of M-Pesa would increase the proportion banked 
by 28 percentage points. Evaluated at the mean adoption rate of 40 percent, we see that M-Pesa 
has increased the proportion banked by almost 11 percentage points, which represents a 58 
percent increase over the 2006 banking level. As the data was collected prior to the integration of 
M-Pesa with banks, this result could be driven by increases in money (or cash) by users. It could 
also be driven by the complementarity between M-Pesa and banks. If M-Pesa were more 
valuable or useful in combination with a bank (or vice versa), then increases in demand for M-
Pesa would also increase the demand for banking. This evidence provides some evidence that M-
Pesa does not entirely serve as a substitute for the formal banking system, but, rather, is viewed 
(or used) as a complementary tool by individuals. 
Qualitative evidence from Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) suggests that M-pesa is 
used as a saving instrument. This notion is supported by the 2009 round of the Finaccess survey 
in which over 25% of individuals report using M-Pesa as a saving device. While we do not have 
data on the amount saved, we do have information on the methods used to save and can therefore 
examine the impact of M-Pesa on savings methods. Row (7) of Table 13 shows the impact of M-
Pesa on the use of informal saving mechanisms. Informal saving mechanisms include rotating 
saving and credit associations (ROSCA), saving with a group of friends, savings given to a 
family or friend for safe-keeping, and saving by storing funds in a secret place. While the 
summary statistics show that the proportion of individuals using informal methods to save has 
increased from 52 percent to 72 percent, our estimates show that M-Pesa decreases the use of 
informal saving mechanisms. Evaluated at the mean M-Pesa adoption rate, M-Pesa would reduce 
the prevalence of informal saving by 15 percentage points, approximately a 30%  reduction from 
the 2006 level. We observe similar effects for the use of secret hiding places to save money. Row 
(8) of Table 13 shows that for the average adoption rate, M-Pesa would reduce the proportion of 
people saving money in secret places by 30 percentage points, which is slightly greater in 
magnitude than the 2006 level. Since we do not observe any changes in the use of formal savings methods (which do not include M-Pesa), these results suggest that users are shifting savings from 
informal tools to M-Pesa perhaps due to the superior security of M-Pesa. 
M-Pesa could also affect economic activity directly by increasing access to funds and 
indirectly by increasing savings and banking rates. Plyler et al (2010) argue that M-Pesa has 
promoted the growth rates of (small-scale) firms in the communities they studied, and they argue 
that this was largely driven by the increased circulation of money in these communities. Figure 7 
provides some supportive evidence of the increase in funds due to M-Pesa, in which almost 35 
percent of individuals report that they sent larger transfers due to M-Pesa, while close to 30 
percent report that they received larger transfers due to M-Pesa. 
We use employment as a measure of economic activity and examine the impacts of M-
Pesa on employment. We use a measure of employment that incorporates farm labor (own-farm 
and on others farm), non-farm labor (such as civil service employment), and self-employment 
(such as owning a shop). Individuals are considered employed if they are actively engaged in any 
of these activities. Row (12) of Table 13 shows that M-Pesa is associated with increases in any 
type of employment. For the average M-Pesa adoption level, M-Pesa would increase 
employment by 12 percentage points, approximately a 15 percent increase from the 2006 
employment level. While this is encouraging, Column (7) shows no impact of M-Pesa on non-
farm employment. This suggests that the increases in employment due to M-Pesa are driven by 
changes in farm employment. One possible explanation is that the increased resource flows due 
to M-Pesa are channeled towards farming, thus boosting the demand for labor and increasing 
employment.   Unfortunately, we do not have the data to investigate these underlying 
mechanisms further. 
We perform some falsification tests to boost the credibility of our empirical 
methodology. At the time the 2009 survey was collected, the international money transfer feature 
of M-Pesa was not yet available. Thus, M-Pesa should have no impact on international money 
transfers. Rows (14) and (15) of Table 13 show that we do not find any significant impact of M-
Pesa on international transfer patterns. This provides some reassurance that our methodology is 
not flawed.  
An additional concern is that our results are driven by unobserved regional trends. 
Ideally, with three rounds of data we would include a set of linear sub-location trends to address 
this concern. However, since we only have two round of data, we attempt to mitigate these 
concerns by including trends at the provincial level. We find that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of these provincial level trends (results not shown).  
 
 
5              M-Pesa Velocity and the E-Money Loop  
   
5.1    Velocity   As a measure of how people are using M-Pesa, and also for the purposes of understanding where 
M-Pesa fits into a broader monetary framework, we are interested in calculating the "velocity" of 
M-Pesa.  In standard monetary economics, "transactions velocity" is defined as the frequency 
with which the average unit of money is used in transactions.  Transactions velocity is different 
than the more frequently measured income velocity of money, which is simply nominal GDP 
divided by the relevant money stock.   
In the case of M-Pesa, the potentially relevant transactions are deposit of money (creation 
of a unit of M-Pesa), transfer, and withdrawl of money (extinguishing of a unit of M-Pesa).  In 
this respect, M-Pesa differs from cash, which, in a simple monetary system, would circulate in 
transactions with only rare instances in which it is created or liquidated (although a piece of cash 
may enter and leave the banking system many times over the course of its life) .  As our measure 
of M-Pesa velocity, we focus only on transfers, which are the closest analogue to purchases 
using money in a simple monetary system -- indeed, if e-money is eventually used in a money-
like fashion, such transfers would play the role of transactions using money. 
Our measure of M-Pesa velocity is thus the total value of person-to-person transfers (per 
unit time) divided by the average outstanding balance of e-float.  For example, if 100 units of e-
float are created at the beginning of month, transferred from person to person five times in the 
month, and extinguished at the end the month, then monthly velocity will be five.  Notice that 
having 100 units of e-float transferred from person to person five times in the month could 
happen either because the people receiving transfers then transferred the e-float to someone else 
or because each time a transfer was received, the recipient withdrew his cash and a new user 
deposited cash and received e-float.  We discuss this issue (the length of the "e-money loop") in 
the next section. 
Of the two numbers required to measure velocity, the harder one to obtain is the 
outstanding balance of e-float. As discussed above, all money deposited to create e-float is held 
by a trust fund which holds deposits in commercial banks.  Thus, the outstanding balance of e-
float is in principle perfectly observable at any point in time, both to Safaricom and to 
regulators.   However, Safaricom treats this quantity as confidential, and does not release any 
information about it.  The only data that we know of on the size of outstanding e-float comes 
from an audit of M-Pesa conducted by the Ministry of Finance in January 2009.  That audit states 
that "whereas the system transacted about 17 billion kshs in August 2008, the net 
deposit/residual value per customer (i.e. deposit less withdrawals) was kshs. 203."  We assume 
that the Ministry of Finance figure of 203 kshs is based on observation of the trust account, 
divided by the number of customers.  According to Safaricom figures, there were 3.73 million 
M-Pesa accounts in August 2008.
8 The implied total value of e-float outstanding was thus 757.2 
million ksh.  According to Safaricom, the volume of person-to-person transfers that month was 
8.32 billion Ksh.  The implied velocity of e-float is 11.0.  In other words, the average unit of M-
Pesa was transferred 11 times per month between customers.  This does not include transfers 
between customers and M-Pesa agents.   Unfortunately, we only have data with which to 
calculate velocity at one point in time, so we do not know how it has been trending. 
                                                 
8 http://www.safaricom.co.ke/fileadmin/template/main/images/MiscUploads/M-PESA%20Statistics.pdf accessed 
June 28, 2010.  
 There is a significant ambiguity affecting this calculation, however, because it is not clear 
whether the figure of 203 ksh. per customer figure includes e-float that was stored on the phones 
of M-Pesa retailers.  Conceptually, we have been thinking about the problem faced by users of 
the system, so we would not want to include such balances.  However, from the point of view of 
Safaricom's accounting, the outstanding stock of e-float includes not only what sits on the phones 
of customers, but also what sits on the phones (i.e. in the electronic tills) of the proprietors of M-
Pesa outlets.  For example, the deposits held at commercial banks back both the e-money of both 
customers and dealers.   If the figure of 203 ksh. per customer were constructed by dividing the 
size of the commercial bank deposits by the number of customers, it would include e-float held 
by M-Pesa outlets.  Because the audit is not explicit, we cannot be sure.  We can get a feel for the 
size of this effect by looking at the number of outlets and their average e-float holdings.   For 
August of 2008, the month from which the figure of 203 ksh. was taken, there were 3,761 outlets 
nationwide, or roughly one per thousand customers.  Eijkman, Kendall, and Mas (2010)  report 
end of day e-float for different types of M-Pesa outlets.  These range from 90,000 ksh. for rural 
stores to 40,000 ksh. for city stores.  Rural stores have particularly high end of day float because 
they do a primarily cash-out business.   City stores did a more balanced business, though with an 
excess of cash-in over cash-out.  These end-of-day figures do not correspond to beginning-of-day 
figures, of course. Furthermore, we do not know at what point in time the measurement of 203 
ksh. per phone was taken.  However, if we choose a value of 50,000 ksh. per outlet, the total 
amount held by outlets was 188.1 million ksh.  Compared to the value of 757.2 million ksh. 
calculated above, this is not insignificant.  If we assume that the earlier figure was inclusive of 
dealer holdings, then e-float held on the phones of customers was 569.1 million ksh.  In this case, 
velocity was 14.6.  
Is this value of velocity high?   If all activity on M-Pesa took the form of someone 
depositing money and transferring it, and if the recipient then withdrew the full amount, a 
velocity of 11 would mean that on average such transactions took slightly less than three days 
between deposit of cash (creation of e-float) and withdrawal of cash (extinction of e-float).  
Velocity of 14.6 would mean that such transactions took on average two days.  It is likely that 
most deposit-transfer-withdrawal events are much faster than this.  In our observation, many 
people who deposit money (purchase e-float) at an M-Pesa outlet immediately transfer their e-
float to another user.  For most recipients, it would not be surprising if they then turned the e-
float they received back into cash within a day.  Thus, viewing M-Pesa as a  money transfer 
system, a value of velocity of 11 or 14.6 seems unexpectedly low rather than high.  On the other 
hand, if one thought that M-Pesa was being used as a store of value, akin to a bank account or 
even to money stored under a mattress, then a velocity of 11 or 14.6 would indeed be high.  
Presumably -- although we have no firm evidence of this -- the observed figure represents a mix 
between a large number of users who keep money in the system for very short periods of time 
and a small number of users who keep money on for extended periods.  Below, we return to the 
question of what this behavior reveals about the optimization problem solved by users.   
    
5.2    The E-Money Loop  Irving Fisher defined the "cash loop" as the number of transactions that a unit of currency goes 
through between being withdrawn from a bank and returning to a bank.  Analogously, we can 
think of the "e-money loop" as the number of transfer transactions that the average unit of M-
Pesa goes through between being transferred onto a customer phone and being transferred back 
from a customer phone to the phone of an M-Pesa agent.   
   
The length of the e-money loop is not necessarily related to the velocity of e-money.  To see 
this, think about the following two scenarios:    
•  Scenario #1:  Mr. A deposits 100 ksh. into M-Pesa on January 1.  He transfers the money 
to Mr. B on January 15.  Mr. B withdraws the money on February 1.  Also on February 1, 
Mr. C deposits 100 ksh.  into M-Pesa, and transfers it to Mr. D. on February 15.  Mr. D 
withdraws the money on March 1.  In this case, velocity is 1 transaction per month, and 
the length of the e-money loop is also 1.     
•  Scenario #2:  Mr. A deposits 100 ksh. into M-Pesa on January 1.  He transfers the money 
to Mr. B on January 15.  Mr. B leaves the e-float on his phone until February 15, at which 
point he transfers it to Mr. C.  The money is repeatedly transferred on the 15th of every 
month, and never withdrawn.  In this case, velocity is one transfer per month while the 
length of the e-money loop is infinite.     
As with velocity, we can put together available scraps of information to get an estimate of the 
length of the e-money loop.  The Ministry of Finance audit quoted above says that "the system 
transacted about kshs. 17 billion" in August 2008.  What does this number mean?  There seems 
to be little ambiguity about the 8.32 billion figure discussed above being the value of person-to-
person transfers, since that is exactly what Safaricom says.  It is likely that 17 billion is the 
volume of cash-in plus cash-out transfers.  A different source (Mwangi and Ndung'u, 2009) gives 
the value of total transactions for August, 2008 at just under 15 billion Ksh., and in this case the 
phrase "monthly transactions" is explicitly defined as "deposits plus withdrawals."  Given that 
one of the authors of this study is chairman of the central bank of Kenya, it is likely that the 
figure is based on the same (non-publicly available) data as the Ministry of Finance audit.  Given 
the similarity in magnitude and the similar phrasing, we take the 17 billion to be similarly 
referring to the value of deposits plus withdrawals in the month. 
Given this observation, what is notable is how close the total of deposits and withdrawals is 
to twice the value of person to person transfers.   The relationship between deposits, withdrawals, 
transfers, and the length of the e-money loop is
9   
                                                 
9 The key assumption required to derive this equation is that the system is in a steady state, where monthly deposits 
are equal to monthly withdrawals.  In this case (deposits + withdrawals)/2 is just equal to the quantity of deposits.   
Also, in this case, transfers made in a given month would be equal to transfers that would eventually be made with 
the e-money created in a given month (which in turn would be equal to that month's deposits.)  The formula is not 
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Thus the data indicate that the length of the e-money loop is roughly one.  This would be true if 
all transactions took the form of deposit-transfer-withdraw.   The total for deposits and 
withdrawals would be less than twice transfers, and the length of the loop greater than one, if 
there were some appreciable fraction of people who received a transfer and then sent the money 
on somewhere else without doing a withdrawal.     Similarly, the total for deposits plus 
withdrawals would more than twice monthly person-to-person transfers if an appreciable number 
of people used their phone to store money without transferring it.  Of course, it is possible that 
there was a good deal of both these activities (receiving money and transferring it onward 
without taking money out, on the one hand, and depositing and withdrawing without transferring, 
on the other), but the data are suggestive, at least to us, of the overwhelming majority of use 
being of the deposit-transfer-withdraw type.  
Using data from Safaricom (for monthly person-to-person transfers) and from Mwangi 
and Ndung'u (for monthly deposits to withdrawals) we can calculate the implied length of the e-
money loop for the period July, 2007-July, 2009.  This is shown in Figure 8.  It is interesting to 
note that in the data the e-money loop starts out at slightly less than one before trending up to 
almost exactly one.  It is possible that the lower figure represents a different use of M-Pesa in the 
program's early days (more cash storage and fewer multiple transfers), but it is also possible that 
this is some sort of measurement error -- recall that the figure for total transfers given in the 
Ministry of Finance audit was about 7% higher than the figure in Mwangi and Ndung'u (2009). 
    
5.3     Implications for Measuring the Money Supply  
   
As M-Pesa and other forms of electronic money have become more prevalent, economists have 
turned their attention to the implications for measurement of monetary aggregates and the 
relationship between money, prices, and real variables. To the extent that e-float is a form of 
money,   failure to measure it in monetary aggregates could lead policy makers astray.   For 
example, if the stock of e-float grew while conventional money did not, monetary policy would 
be looser than policy makers thought.   
   
                                                                                                                                                             
Pesa velocity, one could construct a better estimate, but our sense is that it would not differ significantly. 
 A natural initial approach to this problem would be to simply add the stock of e-money 
into the measures of, say, M1.  This is problematic for two reasons.   First, at least in the case of 
M-Pesa, the existing stock of e-money is backed 100% by transactions accounts held at 
commercial banks.  If these accounts are subtracted from M1 while M-Pesa balances are added, 
the net effect is zero.  Secondly, however, the transactions velocity of e-money may be higher 
than the transactions velocity of other components of M1, such as cash.  Put differently, a small 
amount of M-Pesa, by circulating frequently, provides the same transaction (and transfer) 
services as a much larger quantity of cash. 
If one had estimates of the transactions velocities of M-Pesa and the other components of 
a monetary aggregate, it would then be possible to create a velocity-weighted index, in which 
those components with higher velocity received a   higher weight (see Spindt, 1985, for a 
discussion).  As shown above, getting a rough approximation of the velocity of M-Pesa is not 
difficult, and with better data one could get a truly precise estimate.  Unfortunately, measuring 
the velocity of other monetary aggregates -- a problem on which monetary economists have been 
working since the time of Jevons -- is much harder. 
For this reason, and also out of curiosity of how M-Pesa compares to other monies, we 
have pulled together the few estimates of transaction velocity. The estimates span a number of 
countries and historical eras and, therefore, pertain to a variety of institutional structures and 
transaction technologies.  This may explain some of the vast variation in the data. 
A common measure of the velocity of demand deposits is the "demand deposit turnover 
rate," defined as the ratio of debits to demand deposits in a period to the average value of 
demand deposits.   In the United States, between 1919 and 1941, the annual turnover rate on 
demand deposits at commercial banks varied between 19.4 and 53.6  (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 1976) . In more recent data, the turnover rate for banks excluding major 
New York banks rose from 135 to 475 per month over the period 1980-1995 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, Statistical Abstract, 1996).  Engber (1965) presents data on demand deposit turnover in 
East Africa between 1950-1963, over which period it rose from 4.1 to 9.9 per quarter.  Using 
data from Cletus (2004) the demand deposit turnover rate in Gambia between 1983 and 1993 
varied between 2 and 11 transactions per month.  In Taiwan in 2007, the annual turnover rate on 
demand deposits was 328 (Republic of China, 2009).  In Thailand, monthly demand deposit 
turnover in 2009 averaged 41.
10  
As far as currency goes, there are even fewer estimates of velocity.   Irving Fisher's 
calculations for the years around the beginning of the 20th century in the United States found 
that transactions velocity of cash was in the neighborhood of 20 per year.  Spindt (1985) applies 
a method suggested by Laurent (1970) to look at the velocity of circulation of currency. His 
estimate is that the velocity of currency in the United States ranged between 7 and 10 
transactions per month over the period 1970-85.   A study by the US Federal Reserve based on 
                                                 
10 Bank of Thailand online data 
query http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=31&language=eng  
 household surveys (Avery et al., 1986) estimated the velocity of currency in 1984 at between 50 
and 55 transactions per year.     Feige (1987) estimates the length of the cash loop in the 
Netherlands at approximately 4 transactions in data from the 1960s and 1970s. 
A preliminary, and not very surprising, conclusion from this exercise is that the 
transactions velocity of M-Pesa (either 11 or 14.6 transactions per month) is probably higher 
than other monetary components that are held by households, particularly cash.  M-Pesa velocity 
is not higher than what we see for demand deposits, although the data do not really come from 
comparable economies, and further we believe that demand deposit turnover is dominated by 
large corporations.  For the present, however, even with a velocity adjustment, M-Pesa does not 
compare with other parts of the monetary aggregate.  The average over the period January-June 
2008 of currency (M0) was 85.2 billion shillings, while currency plus demand deposits (M1) was 
393 billion shillings (Central Bank of Kenya, Statistical Bulletin, June 2008).  By contrast, our 
calculated value of outstanding e-float in August 2008 was 757.2 million shillings. 
   
6         Why Isn’t M-Pesa Used for Storing Value?  
   
Much of the evidence presented in our paper is strongly suggestive of the conclusion that M-Pesa 
is only rarely used for storing value for any significant period of time.  This can be seen in the 
low value of average M-Pesa holdings at a point in time (203 ksh, or about three dollars), in the 
high velocity of M-Pesa, and in the short length of the e-money loop.  Although a significant 
fraction of users report that they use their M-Pesa accounts for storing money, such storage is of 
relatively small amounts of money or for relatively short periods of time. 
Why don't people store more value on M-Pesa?  One possible reason is that it does not 
pay interest.  If this is the case, then the implementation of M-Kesho or some other scheme to 
pay interest on transactions could lead to a significant change in behavior.  To gather insight into 
this question, we could ask: at what interest rate would M-Pesa users store significant value on 
their accounts?  
Part of the answer to this question can be gleaned by looking at behavior with respect to 
withdrawals.  Although M-Pesa balances do not pay explicit interest, holding money in M-Pesa 
does yield interest in the form of reducing transaction costs.   Consider the problem of an 
individual who receives periodic transfers into his M-Pesa account.   One strategy would be to 
withdraw each transfer as it is received.  An alternative would be to group two or more transfers 
together and withdraw them all at once.  The latter strategy holds money on the M-Pesa account 
for longer, but involves lower costs. 
A general analysis of alternative withdrawal strategies would be enormously complex, 
given the complexity of the price schedule as well as the stochastic nature and varying sizes of 
transfer receipt.  Here, we examine an extremely simple version of the problem to get a feel for 
the magnitudes involved.  Consider an individual who receives a transfer of 1,000 ksh. on the first of every month.  
We will allow for only two strategies: first, she can take out the money each time she receives a 
transfer.  Alternatively, she can wait until she has accumulated 2,000 (that is, every other month) 
and take the money out then.   On the M-Pesa price schedule, the price of withdrawing 1,000 
ksh. is the same as the price of withdrawing 2,000 (i.e. 25 ksh.).  
Let W be the amount withdrawn, and C be the cost.  The monthly interest rate r at which 
an individual would be indifferent between these two strategies is given implicitly by the 
equation  
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where the left hand side is the present value of withdrawals net of costs using the first strategy 
and the right hand side is the same thing using the second strategy.  The solution is  





=          ( 8 )  
For the example just given (W = 1,000; C = 25), the solution is r=2.6%.  On an annual basis this 
is 36% -- certainly a high interest rate.  Using a smaller value of the amount withdrawn, W, 
would yield a higher implicit interest rate, as would considering an individual who received 
transfers more frequently than every other month.   For example, an individual who received and 
withdrew 500 ksh. every two weeks -- a scenario that seems like it might be consistent with what 
we see in the data -- would be demonstrating a discount rate of at least 240% per year!  
The information on the distribution of withdrawal sizes can also be brought to bear here.  
Although we do not solve the full scale problem, it is clear that for moderate interest rates there 
should be a significant amount of bunching of withdrawals at the high end of price ranges -- that 
is, just below the price notch.  An individual who withdraws only a little more than the price 
notch (say, 3,000 ksh. when the price notch is at 2,500 ksh.) and who is going to be receiving 
another transfer in the next few months, is paying an enormous price to get his/her money early.  
And yet the striking observation from our data on the distribution of withdrawal amounts is that 
there seems to be no bunching at all at the price notch points.   There are also, obviously, a very 
large number of withdrawals of amounts that are far lower than, say, half of the price notch.   
Unfortunately, we do not have the data to be completely formal in this analysis.  Above, 
we described the distribution of withdrawal sizes and the frequency of withdrawals, but we do 
not have these data at the individual level, and so we do not know their joint distribution.  We 
know that most withdrawals are made by individuals who withdraw frequently (every month or 
more frequently), and that a good fraction of withdrawals are small enough (medians around 
1,000 ksh) that two or more of them would fit under the 2,500 ksh. price notch.  We also know that there is not a very large mass of withdrawals at the price notch -- at least no more than 
would be expected given the fact that price notches are at round numbers.  From this data is 
seems reasonable to conclude that a significant fraction of withdrawals are made by people who 
are applying high time discount rates, since otherwise they would be grouping their withdrawals 
into more economical chunks.  
We can extend this example further by considering the costs borne by the sender as well. 
 Although we don't have data on senders, it is a reasonable supposition that in many cases a 
monthly withdrawal of 1,000 Ksh is matched by a monthly transfer of the same amount.  As 
discussed above, the fee for transfers of any size is 30 Ksh.  Thus there would be the possibility 
that a husband or son working in the city could transfer Ksh. 2,000 once ever two months, 
instead of Ksh. 1,000 every month.  The total cost of such a transfer and withdrawal of either 
1,000 or 2,000 Ksh is 55 Ksh (30 Ksh for transfer and 25 Ksh for withdrawal). Plugging this cost 
figure into the equation above, the implicit interest rate at which a family would be indifferent 
between transferring 1,000 Ksh every month and transferring 2,000 Ksh every two months is 
thus 5.8% per month. 
A final observation that suggests that users of M-Pesa have high financial discount rates 
comes from a discussion we had with an employee of Kenya Power and Light Corporation, the 
country's electricity supplier.  Electricity customers receive monthly bills, and must pay them 
within a fixed time window or their power will be cut off.  A bill-pay service was recently 
established, whereby M-Pesa users could pay their bills through their cell phones, rather than by 
directly visiting a KPLC office, post office, or bank, all of which involve waiting in a long line. 
Despite the superior convenience of M-Pesa, the take-up of the service was relatively low; only 
about 12 percent of the 1.2 million customers paid by M-Pesa, and we were curious as to why.  
The employee's theory was that it had to do with the delay involved in paying with M-Pesa. The 
M-Pesa payments were batch processed overnight and thus required between 24 and 48 hours to 
clear, more time than paying in person where the payments were reflected instantly. Therefore 
the person paying the bill by M-Pesa would have to have the money one or two days earlier than 
otherwise.  Evidently, this extra one or two days was, to most potential users, more valuable than 
the huge convenience of not having to pay the bill in person. In fact the KPLC employee stated 
that M-Pesa use for paying electric bills was  actually declining due to this lag in processing. 
This is again suggestive of very high time discount rates. 
It is  important to note that the high financial discount rates that households apply to cash 
that moves through M-Pesa do not necessarily imply that housholds highly discount the future 
consumption flows or utility.   As in a standard Baumol-Tobin model of cash management, 
another reason to hold small cash balances is if there is a high cost of holding cash itself.  Such a 
cost could be due to theft in a conventional sense, which can be viewed as a tax on cash 
balances.  However, crime rates would have to be extremely high to justify the behavior we see.  
A more likely cost of holding cash is the high implicit tax represented by the ability of other 
family members to request either gifts or loans from one's available cash balances. This is notion 
is supported by Ashraf (2009) who reports that women in Kenya often form secret saving 
societies to hide income from their husbands. Finally, and somewhat similarly, holdings of cash 
may simply raise temptations to spend that individuals find impossible to resist. The inability to 
save cash-holdings has been shown to be a constraint to fertilizer adoption in Western Kenya (Duflo et al. 2010) and promotes participation in ROSCAS which can act as a commitment 
saving device (Gugerty, 2007).   It could be that the extra   transaction costs associated with 
holding small cash balances are a price worth paying to avoid giving in to these temptations. 
These observations might be taken to suggest that the types of interest rates potentially 
offered through cell phone banking will do little to alter the amount of money that people store 
on their phones.   However, recent literature on the financial lives of the poor may suggest 
otherwise.  Collins, et al.,  (2009),  find that the world’s poor utilize a vast range of financial 
instruments to meet different needs, and prioritize different qualities of these instruments based 
on how they use them.  For instruments used to smooth day-to-day consumption, they find that it 
is most important to the poor that these keep their money secure and easily accessible, but pay 
little attention to the interest they might earn.  However, when the poor seek to accumulate what 
Collins, et al. refer to as “usefully large sums” to pay for life-cycle events (such as weddings or 
funerals) or other larger expenses, they do take into account the interest that different financial 
tools can offer them, along with their security, reliability, and structure (for example, requiring 
them to make periodic deposits to help ensure that they will succeed in building up a larger sum 
of money).  Based on this, we might say that M-Pesa has found a niche in the former realm of 
day-to-day cash management, but not as much in the accumulation of larger sums.   The 
introduction of a program encouraging saving and offering interest, might allow mobile banking 
to find an additional niche as a simple and secure financial tool for the accumulation of usefully 
large sums.  One survey found that 38% of respondents said that the feature they would most like 
to see added to M-Pesa was the ability to earn interest on their accounts, making this the most 
popular response (Jack, Pulver, and Suri, 2009)  This suggests that interest will be an attractive 
feature of M-Kesho. (As discussed above, M-Kesho will also offer insurance and micro loans, 
which may also be attractive features.) 
   
7.        Conclusion  
In this paper we have examined M-Pesa from a number of different perspectives. Using firm-
level data from competing money transfer services we find that the introduction of M-Pesa has 
led to significant decreases in the prices of competitors. In addition we examine micro-level data 
from the Finaccess surveys, where we find that the frequent M-Pesa users are more likely to be 
urban, educated, banked, and affluent. Our analysis of the 2006 and 2009 rounds of the Finacess 
surveys reveal that M-Pesa use increases frequency of sending transfers, decreases the use of 
informal saving mechanisms such as ROSCAS, and increases the probability of being banked. 
This suggests that M-Pesa is complementary to banks, whereby the adoption of M-Pesa has 
increased the demand for banking products. 
Although a significant number of survey respondents indicate that they use their M-Pesa 
accounts as a vehicle for saving, our analysis of aggregate data suggests that the overwhelming 
use of M-Pesa is for transferring money from individual to individual, with extremely little 
storage of value.   This can be seen in many ways.  Our estimates of M-Pesa velocity, the number 
of transactions per month for the typical unit of e-float, is either 11.0 or 14.6 transactions per 
month, depending on some auxiliary assumptions. We also estimate the length of the "e-money loop," that is, the average number of person to person transactions that take place between the 
creation and destruction of a unit of e-float.  Our estimate is quite near one.  Although we cannot 
be certain, we take this as evidence that the vast majority of M-Pesa use is of the form of a cash 
deposit, followed by a single person-to-person transfer of e-float, followed by a cash 
withdrawal.  
Our analysis of data on the size and frequency of M-Pesa withdrawals also suggests that 
M-Pesa users have relatively high opportunity costs of holding funds on their phones.   For 
example, there seems to be little evidence of users bunching several transfer receipts together 
into a single withdrawal in order to economize on fees.  This suggests that even if M-Pesa were 
to pay interest at the same rate as banks, there would not be a significant change in the saving 
behavior of users.    
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Data Appendix:  
 
A.1 FinAccess surveys:  
 
The FinAcess surveys, conducted in 2006 and 2009, are nationally representative household 
surveys that were designed to measure financial access in Kenya. The surveys were collected by 
Financial Sector Deepening Trust Kenya (FSD Kenya), with financial and technical support from 
a variety of partners including the Central Bank of Kenya, donors and a number of commercial 
banks in Kenya.The 2006 round consisted of approximately 4,400 individuals, while the 2009 
round consisted of close to 6,600 individuals. A unique feature of this data is that it aimed to 
capture access to a wide range of both formal and informal financial tools. Moreover, the 
consistency of the surveys enable reliable comparisons across time of the changing nature of 
financial access.  Using sampling weights we can aggregate the data to the sublocation level. 
Sublocations are the lowest administrative unit in Kenya and consist of 2 to 3 villages in rural 
areas or a large neighborhood in a city. We combine  the 2006 and 2009 FinAcess surveys and 
create a balanced panel of the 190 sub-locations that were surveyed in both rounds.  
We constructed the measure of transfer frequency as follows. We converted the 
categorical responses into annual numerical values as follows. Daily = 365 times a year, Weekly 
- 52 times a year, Monthly = 12 times a year, Irregularly/once in a while= 1 times a year. We 
then used these conversion factors to change categorical responses on transfer sent and received 
frequencies as well as M-Pesa use frequencies into annualized numerical values.   
Our wealth measure is constructed by using principal component analysis on the household 
assets and durable goods such as televisions and refrigerators. We then create wealth quantile 
dummies based on the principal component analysis. 
A.2 Transfer Prices: 
Kabbucho et al. (2003) document the prices of various money transfer methods. We use their 
data from 2003 as the baseline and compare it to current (2010) prices of Moneygram and 
Western Union. The Moneygram fee schedule is documented online, while the Western Union 
rates were collected in person by research staff. These fees are converted into a database that 
contains prices for a series of transfer amounts in 100 Kshs intervals. This allows us to compare 
the prices across comparable set of prices. 
 
A.3 M-Pesa Transaction data:  
We collect M-Pesa transaction data from an agent in Kisumu. These data contained transaction 
type and transaction amount over a three month period in 2010 for three M-Pesa shops. The first 
show Katito is in  a rural area, while; Homa Bay is in a small town while Cyber is in an urban 
environment. Further details of these stores can be obtained from  Eijkman et al (2010).  Table 1: M-Pesa Fee Schedule 
source: Safaricom 2010. Table 2: Summary Statistics of Transactions at M-Pesa Agents
Cyber Center Katito Homa Bay Cyber Center Katito Homa Bay
N 3,477 6,401 2,787 3,544 2,524 3,716
Mean 2,757 1,402 5,762 3,773 3,425 5,240
Std. dev. 4,799 1,854 8,671 5,949 6,598 6,790
Skewness 4.03 5.27 2.17 3.07 3.21 2.29
10th 300 250 390 300 200 500
25th 500 475 700 578 390 1,000
Median 1,000 900 1,970 1,500 1,000 2,500
75th 2,850 1,680 6,500 4,000 3,000 6,475
90th 6,370 3,000 18,500 10,001 10,000 14,000






















Table 3: Distribution of Final Two Digits of Deposit Amounts
Note: M-Pesa Deposit data from an Agent in Kisumu. Deposits 
smaller than Ksh. 2,600.  N=6,036Less than or equal to 35000 Greater than 35,000 Difference
Pre -Mpesa 0.1401 0.0468 -0.0934***
(0.0047) (0.0001)
Post-Mpesa 0.0431 0.0112 -0.0319***
(0.0023) (0.0002)
Difference -0.097*** -0.0356*** -0.0703***
Transfer Amount
Table 4: Average Prices of Transfers as a Pct of Transfer Amount
Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses. P values of the T-Test for the difference of means 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * . Western Union and Moneygram prices only. Transactions where 
fees exceed transfer amount are excluded.Table 5: Impact of M-Pesa on Prices of Competitors
(1) (2) (3)
Transfer ≤ 35000 0.0863*** 0.0715***
(0.0063) (0.0062)
Post dummy -0.0356*** -0.0356*** -0.0356***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
(Transfer ≤ 35000) x Post -0.0614*** -0.0615*** -0.0687***
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0071)
Constant 0.0626*** 0.0723*** 0.0582***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Additional Controls:
Company FE Yes Yes Yes
Control for Transfer Amount  
& Transfer Amount Squared No Yes No
Transfer Amount FE No No Yes
Observations 18,694 18,694 18,694
R-squared 0.494 0.533 0.818
Notes: Pre period is 2003 and post period is 2010. 
The M-Pesa transfer limit is 35,000Kshs
Data from Kabuccho et al (2003), Western Union and Moneygram. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Transfer Fees (as % of Transfer Amount)Table 6: Falsification Test on the Impact of M-Pesa on Prices of Competitors
(1) (2) (3)
Post Dummy -0.0366*** -0.0379*** -0.0382***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Fake Threshold x Post 0.00699*** 0.0114*** 0.0116***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Constant 0.0543*** 0.0543*** 0.0543***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Fake Threshold 100,000 125,000 150,000
Additiona Controls:
Company FE Yes Yes Yes
Transfer Amount FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,318 17,318 17,318
R-squared 0.912 0.92 0.922
Notes: Pre period is 2003 and post period is 2010. 
The real M-Pesa transfer limit is 35,000Kshs
Data from Kabuccho et al (2003), Western Union and Moneygram. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Transfer Fees (as % of Transfer Amount)Table 7:  M-Pesa Adoption
Use M-Pesa







Female 35.5% 24.7% 32.1% 24.1%
Male 42.5% 35.3% 36.6% 32.7%
Financial Access
Not banked 27.5% 17.8% 23.9% 15.9%
Banked 71.9% 64.0% 65.2% 64.0%
Residence
Rural 28.8% 18.8% 25.9% 18.3%
Urban 62.2% 54.8% 54.1% 51.0%
Wealth
Not poor 52.4% 43.2% 46.0% 41.0%
Poor 18.7% 9.4% 17.1% 9.0%
Age
Under 55 42.4% 32.9% 37.4% 31.1%
Over 55 20.2% 11.9% 18.4% 12.2%
Education
At least primary school 55.2% 44.3% 49.2% 42.4%
Less than primary school 16.4% 9.4% 14.1% 8.5%
Employment Status
Unemployed 35.0% 23.7% 31.1% 22.7%
Employed 39.4% 30.8% 34.9% 29.2%
Not employed in non-farm job 28.9% 18.6% 26.0% 18.5%
Employed in non-farm job 56.0% 48.7% 48.8% 44.9%
Access to Cell Phone
Does not have a cell phone 14.2% 7.4% 12.0% 2.6%
Has a cell phone 66.0% 53.8% 59.0% 56.3%
Sample Size 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598
Notes: Data are from the 2009 FinAccess Survey.  Poor is defined as "Poor" is defined as individuals in the bottom two 









































Female 36.6% 23.6% 16.7% 4.8% 4.7% 3.0% 2.1% 2.1% 1.2% 1.2%
Male 48.5% 30.0% 20.2% 8.4% 6.9% 4.7% 4.7% 3.4% 2.6% 2.5%
Financial Access
Not banked 26.8% 19.4% 10.9% 1.9% 2.6% 0.3% 1.2% 0.7% 1.5% 0.6%
Banked 60.2% 34.9% 27.1% 12.0% 9.4% 7.9% 5.7% 5.0% 2.2% 3.1%
Residence
Rural 30.4% 21.0% 14.1% 4.3% 4.4% 1.6% 2.3% 1.5% 1.8% 1.4%
Urban 55.4% 32.9% 23.1% 9.0% 7.2% 6.3% 4.4% 4.0% 1.9% 2.2%
Wealth
Not poor 48.2% 29.5% 20.7% 7.8% 6.6% 4.6% 3.6% 3.3% 2.0% 2.1%
Poor 17.6% 14.7% 8.9% 1.2% 2.3% 0.6% 1.7% 0.4% 1.2% 0.4%
Age
Under 55 44.4% 27.9% 18.8% 6.7% 5.9% 3.9% 3.3% 2.7% 1.8% 1.9%
Over 55 18.9% 13.5% 13.5% 4.5% 4.1% 2.9% 2.5% 2.0% 2.0% 0.8%
Education
At least primary school 48.1% 29.2% 20.5% 7.7% 6.2% 4.5% 3.7% 3.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Less than primary school 15.3% 14.5% 8.8% 1.1% 3.4% 0.6% 1.5% 1.1% 1.1% 0.8%
Employment Status
Unemployed 36.1% 21.9% 14.2% 5.4% 3.2% 3.2% 2.3% 2.0% 1.4% 0.9%
Employed 43.6% 27.8% 19.4% 6.8% 6.4% 3.9% 3.5% 2.9% 2.0% 2.0%
Not employed in non-farm job 29.8% 20.1% 12.4% 4.1% 3.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.0%
Employed in non-farm job 53.8% 32.7% 24.0% 8.7% 7.5% 5.4% 4.6% 3.6% 2.0% 2.5%
Access to Cell Phone
Does not have a cell phone 10.4% 7.1% 2.8% 0.8% 2.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.4% 0.8%
Has a cell phone 49.9% 31.3% 22.2% 7.9% 6.4% 4.6% 4.0% 3.2% 2.0% 2.0%
Sample Size 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598












Female 15.7 1.2% 12.5% 32.4% 53.9%
Male 21.4 2.2% 16.6% 33.1% 48.1%
Financial Access
Not banked 10.4 0.4% 8.1% 30.3% 61.2%
Banked 27.8 3.1% 21.9% 35.6% 39.3%
Residence
Rural 13.5 0.9% 10.3% 31.3% 57.5%
Urban 23.9 2.5% 19.1% 34.4% 44.0%
Wealth
Not poor 20.4 1.9% 16.4% 33.9% 47.8%
Poor 10.2 0.6% 6.6% 28.2% 64.7%
Age
Under 55 18.8 1.6% 15.1% 32.9% 50.3%
Over 55 13.4 1.2% 7.8% 30.7% 60.2%
Education
At least primary school 20.2 1.9% 16.0% 33.3% 48.8%
Less than primary school 10.3 0.4% 7.6% 30.0% 62.0%
Employment Status
Unemployed 15.1 1.1% 11.7% 33.4% 53.9%
Employed 19.2 1.8% 15.2% 32.5% 50.5%
Not employed in non-farm job 12.9 0.8% 9.8% 31.5% 57.9%
Employed in non-farm job 23.5 2.4% 18.9% 34.0% 44.8%
Access to Cell Phone
Does not have a cell phone 6.2 0.0% 2.9% 26.9% 70.1%
Has a cell phone 21.3 2.0% 17.3% 34.2% 46.5%
Sample Size 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598 6,598
Notes: Data are from the 2009 FinAccess Survey.  Poor is defined as "Poor" is defined as individuals in the bottom two wealth quintiles of an asset indexTable 10: Summary Statistics from Estimation Sample
Mean SD Mean SD
Frequency of Domestic Transfers Received 4.303 (3.544) 1.125 (1.580)
Frequency of Domestic Transfers Sent 2.547 (3.063) 1.079 (1.678)
Frequency of international Transfers Received 0.298 (0.840) 0.17 (0.565)
Frequency of International Transfers Sent 0.0762 (0.295) 0.0478 (0.225)
Banked 0.285 (0.233) 0.186 (0.200)
Uses Informal Saving Product 0.729 (0.196) 0.518 (0.275)
Hides Money for Savings 0.522 (0.239) 0.251 (0.256)
Uses Formal Saving Product 0.342 (0.251) 0.271 (0.241)
Has a Formal Loan 0.101 (0.120) 0.0903 (0.131)
Has an Informal Loan 0.331 (0.211) 0.255 (0.262)
Employed 0.755 (0.153) 0.799 (0.157)
Employed in Non-Farm Sector 0.366 (0.261) 0.364 (0.267)
% that feel sending money with a friend is slow 0.335 (0.208) 0.335 (0.208)
% that feel sending money with postal servive 0.245 (0.193) 0.245 (0.193)
% that own a cell phone 0.294 (0.273) 0.294 (0.273)
Observations 190 190 190 190
Notes: Data from the Finaccess Survey aggregated to the Sublocation Level. Only Sublocations
that were in both rounds were included in the estimation sample
2009 2006Table 11: Impact of M-Pesa on Transfers, Employment and Financial Access
Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
(1) % Receive a Transfers  0.286*** (0.064) 0.176*** (0.061)
(2) % Sent a Transfer 0.374*** (0.053) 0.262*** (0.064)
(3) Frequency of Transfers Received 1.03 (1.069) 0.956 (1.184)
(4) Frequency of Transfers Sent 3.386*** (0.669) 3.553*** (0.670)
(5) Banked 0.179*** (0.040) 0.189*** (0.044)
(6) Belong to group 0.209*** (0.069) 0.161** (0.080)
(7) Informal saving -0.0785 (0.080) -0.277*** (0.094)
(8) Hide Money For Savings+ -0.187** (0.083) -0.357*** (0.105)
(9) Formal Savings 0.152*** (0.043) 0.152*** (0.045)
(10) Formal Loan -0.011 (0.033) 0.00334 (0.035)
(11) Informal Loan -0.00328 (0.069) -0.0892 (0.089)
(12) Employed 0.115** (0.053) 0.133** (0.061)
(13) Employed in Non-Farm Job 0.0841 (0.054) 0.084 (0.062)
Notes: Each Row is the coefficient on M-Pesa use from seperate regressions. Data from the Finaccess Survey aggregated to the 
Sublocation Level. Only Sublocations that were in both rounds were included in the estimation sample. Sublocation Fixed Effects 
and Sublocation Random Effects estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at sublocation level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. + Hide Money For Savings is a subset of informal Savings, Frequency of Transfers only includes domestic 
transfers. Additional Controls:Male, Married, Education, Age, Wealth, Year. There are 380 Observations in each regression 
specification
Random Effects Fixed Effects
M-Pesa Use
(1) (2)Table 12: First Stage Relationship
M-Pesa Adoption
(1)
% that rate sending money with a friend is risky 0.169**
(0.0838)
% that rate sending money with post office is slow 0.298***
(0.0988)






First stage F 26.09
Notes: Data from the Finaccess Surveys aggregated to the Sublocation Level. Only 
Sublocations that were in both rounds were included in the estimation sample First 
Difference/ Fixed Effect Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at sublocation level 
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are 190 Observations rather than 
380 as the data is first differenced. Additional Controls:Male, Married, Education, Age, 
Wealth, Year. MTC is Money transfer company such as Western Union or MoneyGramTable 13: Impact of M-Pesa on Transfers, Employment and Financial Access
Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error
(1) % Receive a Transfers  0.171 (0.109)
(2) % Sent a Transfer 0.299*** (0.108)
(3) Frequency of Transfers Received 2.749 (2.442)
(4) Frequency of Transfers Sent 5.300*** (1.257)
(5) Banked 0.279*** (0.082)
(6) Belong to group 0.432*** (0.125)
(7) Informal saving -0.383** (0.184)
(8) Hide Money For Savings+ -0.772*** (0.202)
(9) Formal Savings 0.273*** (0.084)
(10) Formal Loan 0.00385 (0.080)
(11) Informal Loan 0.0456 (0.159)
(12) Employed 0.308*** (0.116)
(13) Employed in Non-Farm Job 0.094 (0.112)
Falsification Exercise:
(14)
Frequency of International Transfers 
Received 0.295 (0.661)
(15) Frequency of International Transfers Sent -0.0861 (0.130)
Notes:Each Row is the coefficient on M-Pesa use from seperate regressions. Data from the 
Finaccess Survey aggregated to the Sublocation Level. Only Sublocations that were in both 
rounds were included in the estimation sample. First Difference/ Fixed Effect- Instrumental 
Variable Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at sublocation level in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ Denotes Endogenous Variables. Excluded instruments are % 
rate transfers by post office are slowes , % rate transfers by friend are riskiest, % rate money 
transfer company are most expensive..+ Hide Money For Savings is a subset of informal 
Savings, Receipt and frequency of transfers in rows (1) to (4) only includes domestic 
transfers. There are 190 Observations rather than 380 as the data is first 
























































































































Figure 5: Changes in Prices at Money Transfer Companies 
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